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COMMENTARIES
PASSIVE SMOKING LITIGATION IN




For hundreds of years, nonsmokers have complained bitterly about being
forced to inhale the tobacco smoke of others.' Until the last twenty years,
however, the physiological effects of secondhand smoke were not well docu-
mented. Recent scientific evidence suggests that the chronic inhalation of
"passive" smoke, referred to by the acronym ETS, for environmental to-
bacco smoke, may be linked to everything from irritation of the eyes and
exacerbation of asthma and other lung diseases to increased cancer risks.2
The new information regarding the health risks of passive smoking parallels
the development of the scientific link between voluntary smoking and can-
cer, a link which is now being used by smokers to attack the tobacco indus-
try with unprecedented success.
The tobacco industry is, however, not the prime target for the ETS plain-
tiff. At risk is the passive smoker's employer, which faces liability for al-
lowing the health hazard to exist and persist in the workplace environment.
The pattern for ETS litigation has already emerged in Australia, where in
May 1992 a jury ordered the New South Wales Department of Health to pay
$85,000 to an employee who claimed workplace smoke had exacerbated her
asthma and caused her to develop emphysema.4 The events preceding the
verdict, as well as the corporate panic immediately following, may fore-
1. See, e.g., KING JAMES I, A COUNTERBLASTE TO TOBACCO (1604) (calling smoking a
custom loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain, and dangerous to the
lung).
2. See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text, for discussion of health hazards of pas-
sive smoking.
3. See infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text, for discussion of recent smoking litiga-
tion in the U.S.
4. Scholem v. New S. Wales Dep't of Health, No. 40830/86 (D.N.S. Wales, May 27,
1992). A transcript of the Court's summation is on file in the office of The Journal of Contem-
porary Health Law and Policy.
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shadow similar developments in this country in the not-so-distant future.5
This Comment examines the convergence of scientific data and changing
public policy in the context of passive smoking litigation both in Australia
and in the United States, and how workplace safety laws and regulations will
be affected. Part I focuses on the increasingly convincing scientific data re-
garding passive smoking. Part II considers American court trends regarding
smoking litigation, with particular emphasis on the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., and how future ETS cases
may be affected by the courts' increasing willingness to accept as conclusive
the scientific evidence linkihg smoking and disease. Part III analyzes the
aforementioned Australian ETS case, Scholem v. New South Wales Depart-
ment of Health, and its immediate ramifications on that country's workplace
smoking guidelines. Part IV concentrates on the workplace safety laws and
anti-smoking laws that are both reflective of changing public mores and rele-
vant to future ETS litigation. The conclusion suggests that ETS litigation
will not represent a major source of liability for employers because the threat
of lawsuits and the overwhelming costs of health insurance will accelerate
the proactive adoption of smoke-free workplace policies in the United States
both by legislatures and by employers.
I. COMPILING THE DATA: MAKING A CASE FOR SMOKE-FREE
WORKPLACES
A. The Health Hazards of Smoking
The correlation between smoking and a number of illnesses has been
drawn with increasing clarity since the 1950s, when the Surgeon General's
office organized a joint task force with the American Heart Association, the
National Cancer Institute and the National Heart Institute to investigate the
effects of smoking.6 In 1964, the Surgeon General produced the first in a
series of reports summarizing the consequences of smoking.7 Since that
time, various studies have asserted that smoking contributes to heart, lung,
coronary, and gastrointestinal diseases; emphysema and bronchitis; and
cancer of the mouth, esophagus, larynx, pharynx, lungs, kidneys, bladder,
5. See infra notes 125-144 and accompanying text, for discussion on the Australian deci-
sion and its ramifications on legislation and future litigation in that country.
6. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN Svcs., THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 1 1-
13 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
7. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS., SMOKING AND HEALTH: RE-
PORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE (1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
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and pancreas.' In light of the Surgeon General's report, Congress passed
legislation in 1965 regulating cigarette advertising and mandating that every
package of cigarettes sold in the United States bear the following label:
"Warning: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous To Your Health." 9 This
warning language was strengthened in 196910 and enlarged in 1984,1 at
which time Congress approved four rotating texts for use in advertising as
well as on all packs of cigarettes.
12
Despite the scientific evidence-to date, over 50,000 studies have been
published detailing the hazards of smoking 3-and the intensive warning
campaign waged by Congress, smoking continued to claim hundreds of
thousands of victims annually. In 1986, the Surgeon General stated that
cigarette smoking "contributes to at least 160,000 deaths each year-
equivalent to a packed jumbo-jetliner crashing every twelve hours."' 4 Two
years later, the Surgeon General revised this estimate to 300,000 deaths per
year. I5 As of 1985, the number of cigarettes smoked in this country was
approximately 600 billion. 16 Although the percentage of Americans who
smoke has declined in the last decade, roughly 50 million people continued
8. See Douglas N. Jacobson, After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: How Wide Will the
Floodgates of Cigarette Litigation Open?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1027-28 n.42 (1989) (listing
relevant Surgeon General's Reports).
9. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)).
10. The new language read, Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Ciga-
rette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87 (1969) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1)
(1988)).
11. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 474, § 4(a), 98 Stat.
2201 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1988)).
12. The four rotating texts, each preceded by SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING, are
as follows:
Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate
Pregnancy;
Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks To Your Health;
Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth
Weight; and Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide. Id.
13. Advertising of Tobacco Products: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986)
(statement of Rep. Waxman).
14. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN Svcs., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING-A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 57 (1986) [hereinafter
1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT] (emphasis omitted).
15. 1988 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 6, at vi.
16. COMMITrEE ON PASSIVE SMOKING OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Envi-
ronmental Tobacco Smoke: Measuring Exposures and Assessing Health Effects 17 (1986) [here-
inafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL].
1993]
566 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 9:563
to smoke in 1992.1
B. The Health Hazards of Passive Smoking
The act of smoking naturally involves not only the person inhaling di-
rectly from the cigarette but also those who share an airspace with the vol-
untary smoker. The burning tobacco and paper are either inhaled by the
smoker as "mainstream" smoke or released directly into the environment as
"sidestream" smoke.'" The passive smoker inhales both types of smoke-
sidestream and exhaled mainstream-together, a combination known as en-
vironmental tobacco smoke ("ETS").19 In the last decade, scientists have
begun amassing data correlating ETS intake with health disorders in much
the same fashion as they did with direct smoking research. The organs most
directly affected by ETS exposure are the eyes, nose, throat, and lungs.20
Hypersensitive individuals, such as those with asthma or allergies, may expe-
rience headaches, nausea, wheezing, and coughing. 2'
Although studies have sought to establish links between ETS exposure
and lung disorders, cancers, and cardiovascular disease, the data regarding
these links were criticized by scientists as based on flawed or biased method-
ology. 22 Much of the difficulty in establishing the link is due to the nature of
the studies: researchers proceed from the assumption that ETS ingestion is
approximately equivalent to a low-level dose of mainstream smoke, an as-
17. Jay Mathews, Packaging Unfiltered Nostalgia: Liggett Seeks to Revive Chesterfield
With a Puffofthe Past, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1992, at DI.
18. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 14.
19. The exact contents of ETS remain largely undefined for several reasons: first, tobacco
smoke contains roughly 3,800 chemical compounds, many of which undergo chemical and
physical changes upon reaction with the air; second, the properties of ETS change as the
smoke lingers in the air; third, concentration varies according to the quality of ventilation and
purification equipment; and fourth, ETS content is also affected by the inhalation of the
smoker, as some elements of the mainstream smoke are absorbed into the smoker's respiratory
tract and are not expired into the atmosphere. Id. The extent to which these variables render
studies ineffective is a point of disagreement among scientists. See, e.g., Delbert J. Eatough et
al., The Chemical Characterization of Environmental Tobacco Smoke, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM AT MCGILL UNIVERSITY, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO
SMOKE 3 (Donald J. Ecobishon & Joseph M. Wu, eds. 1990) (hereinafter McGill Symposium).
But cf NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 44- 47.
20. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 14, at 112 (cited in Kathryn M. Doo-
lan & Robert A. Indeglia, Jr., A Call For Action: the Burning Issue of Smoke in the Workplace,
5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 221, 222 (1989) [hereinafter A Call For Action].
21. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 213-16.
22. See, e.g., Peter N. Lee, Passive Smoking and Lung Cancer Association: A Result of
Bias?, 6 HUM. TOXICOLOGY 517-24 (1987); McGill Symposium, supra note 19, at 62-63. The
symposium itself is subject to questions of bias, however; its major sponsor was the tobacco
industry.
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sumption which now appears to be inaccurate.23 Further, questionnaires
used to formulate the background data for these studies may be falsified by
active or recovering smokers ashamed to admit their habits, thereby creating
the illusion that the health impact of passive smoke is more severe than it is
in reality.24 Nevertheless, as the number of studies linking ETS exposure to
health hazards increases, and the methodological flaws are removed, the evi-
dence becomes more difficult to refute.2" This pattern follows the earlier
accumulation of scientific information regarding the health risks of direct
inhalation but has proceeded at a much faster rate.
Most disturbing is the impact of ETS exposure on children.26 Parental
smoking has been cited as a cause of chronic ear infections and effusions,
which require surgery in some cases and may also lead to hearing loss.
27
Bronchitis, pneumonia, and other lower-respiratory-tract illnesses occur
more frequently during the first year of life of children when at least one
parent smokes.28 A 1974-1979 Harvard University study of over ten thou-
sand children between six and thirteen years old found a distinct increase in
the risk of all respiratory illnesses and symptoms. 29 Passive smoking may
also contribute to the development of asthma in children.30 Fetal lung de-
velopment or birth weight may even be inhibited by maternal ETS
exposure. 31
Between 1990 and 1993, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) de-
veloped a report on the health effects of passive smoking.32 The report con-
cluded that ETS is responsible for approximately 2,500 to 3,500 lung cancer
23. See Roy J. SHEPARD, THE RISKS OF PASSIVE SMOKING 15-17 (1982) (reviewing then-
current techniques for measuring smoking patterns); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 16, at 4-7 (discussing need for different testing methods because of difficulty in analysis of
ETS content and effect).
24. Maxwell W. Layard, Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Cancer: The Epidemiologic
Evidence, in McGill Symposium, supra note 19, at 104.
25. See Dimitrios Trichopoulos et al., Active and Passive Smoking and Pathological In-
dicators of Lung Cancer Risk in an Autopsy Study, 268 JAMA 1697, 1700 (1992) (removing
bias by interviewing next of kin for autopsy study).
26. At the McGill Symposium sponsored by the tobacco industry, one researcher called
the link between ETS exposure and childhood respiratory diseases provocative. Raphael J.
Witorsch, Parental Smoking and Respiratory Health and Pulmonary Function in Children: A
Review of the Literature, in McGill Symposium, supra note 19, at 220.
27. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 14, at 58-59.
28. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 200.
29. J.H. Ware et al., Passive Smoking, Gas Cooking, and Respiratory Health of Children
Living in Six Cities, 122 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 366, 369 (1984).
30. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 14, at 58.
31. Julie E. Lippert, Prenatal Injuries From Passive Tobacco Smoke: Establishing a Cause
of Action for Negligence, 78 Ky. L.J. 865, 873 (1989-90).
32. Tom Kenworthy, EPA Advisers Call Smoke a Hazard to Health of Children, WASH.
POST, Oct. 28, 1992, at A23.
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deaths per year among nonsmokers, including both former smokers and
those who have never smoked.33 ETS is also attributed to 300,000 lower
respiratory tract infections in children annually. 4 The report concludes
that the EPA should regulate ETS as a Class A carcinogen, "known human
carcinogens," just as it classifies arsenic and asbestos.15 Scientific Advisory
Boards twice approved the draft, which was originally scheduled for release
near the end of 1992.36 On January 7, 1993, the EPA released its report in
final form.
37
In sum, the evidence that ETS exposure contributes to or is responsible for
health risks to nonsmokers is mounting in much the same way as the evi-
dence against direct smoke inhalation did decades ago. The link to lung
cancer has been accepted by the United States government, and the evidence
of the effect of parental smoke on children is particularly stark.38 Further
scientific studies will undoubtedly explore other health risks, particularly
various cancers, while removing the methodological biases in order to
strengthen the evidence already in hand. Clearly, the harm to passive smok-
ers is not limited to a lingering odor or temporary eye irritation.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SMOKING LITIGATION IN AMERICA: IS
CIPOLLONE A SIGN OF THINGS TO COME FOR ETS LITIGANTS?
To date, the vast majority of cases involving smoking injuries has been
brought by smokers themselves, seeking redress against the tobacco industry
for manufacturing dangerous products while hindering the scientific identifi-
cation of health risks involved. 39 Although future ETS litigants will be con-
cerned with their employers rather than the tobacco industry for the most
part, the development of smoking litigation is relevant insofar as it indicates
several trends in judicial treatment of the subject of smoking-related injuries.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Alan B. Horowitz, Terminating the Passive Paradox: a Proposalfor Federal Reg-
ulation of Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 183, 185 n.8 (1991).
36. The report was first approved by an independent science advisory board (SAB) on
April 18, 1991. EPA Board Says Tobacco Smoke a Hazard that Should Be Regulated in the
Workplace, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1620 (Apr. 26, 1991). A second SAB review
resulted in unanimous approval of the report on October 27, 1992. EPA Advisory Board Ap-
proves Report Linking Secondhand Smoke to Lung.Cancer, Daily Labor Rep. (BNA) No. 209,
at A-6 (Oct. 28, 1992), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, DLABRT file.
37. Paul Raeburn, EPA Report Calls Cigarette Smoke 'Substantial' Risk for Nonsmokers,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1993, at A3; Nick Tate, EPA to Link Passive Smoke, Cancer, BOSTON
HERALD, Jan. 5, 1993, at 1.
38. See supra notes 26-31, 34 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 41-82 and accompanying text.
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A. Early Smoking Litigation Proves Hazardous for Plaintiffs
Lawsuits against the tobacco industry are by no means a recent innova-
tion. Since the 1950s, smokers have attacked the cigarette manufacturers
under a variety of legal theories." Prior to the 1980s, however, smoking
litigation was fairly infrequent and uniformly unsuccessful.4 The ten re-
ported smoking cases prior to the 1980s reflect the futility of the exercise:
four were discontinued by actions of the plaintiff;42 in three others, the to-
bacco company was granted summary judgment;43 and the three cases that
involved jury verdicts were all in favor of the defendants." Plaintiffs lacked
money, time, public support, and scientific evidence to support their claims,
while the tobacco industry recognized the Pandora's Box it faced and was
willing to spend as much money as necessary to prevent a finding of
liability.4"
40. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
41. See Leila B. Boulton, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses to Ciga-
rette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 643, 644 n.3 (1987) (noting that [t]he tobacco
industry has never lost or settled a product liability case.).
42. Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961) (negligence and breach of
warranty); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (same);
Fine v. Philip Morris, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (negligence, breach of warranty,
misrepresentation, various other statutory violations); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183
F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960) (negligence and failure to warn).
43. Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Cooper v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
951 (1974).
44. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir.), question certified on reh'g, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), rev'd,
325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam, 409 F.2d
1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
45. One case illustrates the frustrating battle facing early smoking plaintiffs. In Green v.
American Tobacco Co., the plaintiff, Edward Green, sued the American Tobacco Company in
1957 for negligence and breach of implied warranty on the grounds that the defendant's Lucky
Strike cigarettes caused him to develop lung cancer. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962). The case
was heard by two separate juries over the course of thirteen years. The first jury found that the
plaintiff's cancer was caused by smoking Lucky Strikes, but found that the defendant was not
liable because the harm was unforeseeable. After the issue of foreseeability was certified to the
state Supreme Court, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1962), and clarified consistent with the jury deci-
sion, the Fifth Circuit eventually remanded the case to decide the limited issue of whether the
cigarettes were fit for human consumption. 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1962). The second jury
again held for the defendant. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the plaintiff
might have a case in strict liability against the manufacturer for its implication that the ciga-
rettes were fit for consumption. 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968). Finally, the Fifth Circuit reheard
the appeal en banc, and reversed its own decision, reinstating the verdict for the defendant.
409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1970. 397
U.S. 911 (1970). The case, which spanned thirteen years, outlasted its own creator: Edward
Green, the original plaintiff, died in 1958.
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In the 1980s, smoking plaintiffs renewed their assault on the tobacco in-
dustry. Unlike the earlier litigants, who often failed to show sufficient scien-
tific evidence of causation to survive a motion for summary judgment, 6 the
new plaintiffs arrived armed with close to two decades worth of statistics
supporting their claims.47 Heightened public awareness resulting in part
from congressionally-mandated warning labels on cigarette packs48 had
shifted public opinion against the tobacco companies.49 Finally, a new play-
ing field had emerged with the acceptance of strict products liability that
made the plaintiff's task considerably easier.5° Strict liability reflected the
public policy of allocating the cost for injuries from defective products to
those most capable of preparing for, absorbing, and distributing such costs.
The second-generation smoking plaintiffs used the scientific information
to allege negligence and breach of warranty, arguing that tobacco companies
failed to warn smokers adequately of the dangers resulting from smoking.
Further, several suits claimed that the tobacco companies knew of the health
risks well before the publication of the seminal Surgeon General's Report in
196451 and conspired to keep the information from the smoking public.52
Finally, plaintiffs argued that even if the mandatory labels used by the ciga-
rette manufacturers constituted sufficient warning, the advertising strategies
of the companies were intentionally designed to confuse and to mislead the
smoker into disregarding the warning labels through misrepresentations
about the safety of the product.53 As was the case with the first wave of
smoking litigation, the tobacco companies spared no expense to defend
46. Hudson, 427 F.2d at 541; Cooper, 234 F.2d at 170; Albright, 350 F. Supp. at 341.
47. In the past twenty years, the number of scientific studies documenting the health risks
of smoking has increased tenfold. See Jacobson, supra note 8, at 1041.
48. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)).
49. See Note, Plaintiffs' Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers,
99 HARV. L. REV. 809, 813-14 (1986) (estimating that ninety percent of all Americans are
aware cigarette smoking is hazardous to health).
50. Under strict products liability theory, the necessity of proving negligence or fault was
eliminated; instead, the plaintiff merely needed to show that the manufacturer sold its product
in a dangerous or defective condition. Following the Restatement definition, which has been
used as a model by most states in their adoption of strict liability, the tobacco industry would
be held liable even if it had exercised all possible care in the making and selling of the product,
and even if the user lacked contractual privity with the seller. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965); see also William Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1112 (1960); Jacobson, supra note 8, at 1036.
51. See supra note 7.
52. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J.), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1043 (1987).
53. Id.
1993] Passive Smoking Litigation
themselves against the charges. 4 Because of the complexity of the matters
involved, the smoking liability cases again proved time-consuming as the in-
dustry challenged each minor victory for the plaintiffs."
Ironically, until recently the strongest defense for the tobacco industry
was the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.5 6 The industry
argued that their compliance with the requirements of the Act, which barred
further state activity in the area of cigarette health warnings and advertising,
preempted state common law claims. 7 The federal and state courts were
split on the question of preemption, with the majority of courts holding that
the Act preempts claims based on state law as of 196658 and other courts
holding that the Act does not preempt state law claims. 9 The protracted
nature of smoking litigation delayed final resolution of the issue for years.
The Supreme Court, however, in reviewing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 60
finally reached a decision that not only affects future smoking cases, but also
highlights the advantages for potential litigation based on ETS exposure.
B. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
Rose Cipollone and her husband filed suit in 1983 against Liggett Group,
Inc., Philip Morris, Inc., and Loews Corporation, the parent company of
Lorillard, Inc.61 Mrs. Cipollone smoked since 1942 and developed lung can-
54. As reported in Time, tobacco companies spent between $600 million and $3 billion
defending themselves. Stephen Koepp, Tobacco's First Loss, TIME, June 27, 1988, at 50.
55. For example, Cipollone has taken almost a decade to resolve, and as of the most recent
Supreme Court ruling in that case, there were 50-60 cases still pending. Douglas MacLeod,
Supreme Court Reverses Tobacco Liability Rulings; Some Tort Claims Filed by Smokers Not
Preempted, Bus. INS., June 29, 1992, at 1. That number had reached 150 at one point, but the
ruling from the Third Circuit in Cipollone-overturned by the Supreme Court-apparently
discouraged most litigants from continuing their odysseys. Id.
56. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4,
79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)).
57. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2614 (1992).
58. Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 421 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988); Stephen v. American Brands,
Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st
Cir. 1987).
59. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1989); Dewey v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1251 (N.J. 1990).
60. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2608
(1992).
61. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'g 593 F. Supp.
1146 (D.N.J. 1984). Each of the named defendants manufactured one or more of the brands
smoked at various times by Mrs. Cipollone: Liggett Group marketed Chesterfield and L & M
brands, Philip Morris produced Parliament, and Lorillard was the manufacturer of True. Ci-
pollone, 649 F. Supp. at 664-65.
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cer as a result.62 The Cipollones asserted that the defendants negligently or
intentionally failed to warn of the hazards of smoking and advertised so as to
neutralize the warnings on the cigarette packages.63 The plaintiffs also ar-
gued that the tobacco companies conspired to hide the evidence compiled by
scientists regarding the health consequences of smoking. 6' The actions were
based on negligence, breach of warranty, intentional tort, and strict
liability.
65
Consistent with their overall strategy against recent smoking plaintiffs, the
tobacco companies argued that the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act (the 1965 Act) preempted all state common law tort claims
arising after that date.66 In a series of rulings which reflected the split
among jurisdictions at that time, the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey held that the Act did not preempt state common law
claims, 67 but the Third Circuit reversed the decision on appeal. 6' The cir-
cuit court held that although the 1965 Act did not expressly preempt state
common law actions, an implicit preemption existed that barred claims "that
challenge either the adequacy of the warning on cigarette packages or the
propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and promotion
of cigarettes. ' '69 The District Court complied with the ruling on remand,
although Judge Sarokin "vehemently disagreed" with the decision.7" The
District Court, however, did allow the plaintiff to continue on three counts:
first, that the companies negligently researched and tested their products;
second, that the companies conspired to suppress data regarding smoking
hazards; and third, that the defendants could have provided a less dangerous
cigarette under strict liability risk analysis.7 ' All claims arising before 1966
were also continued.72
By the time the case reached the jury, only Liggett's failure to warn and
breach of warranty were at issue, along with the misrepresentation and con-
spiracy claims against each of the three defendants. 73 The jury found for the




66. Id. at 183.
67. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984).
68. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 187 (footnote omitted).
70. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D.N.J. 1986).
71. Id. at 668-75.
72. The continuation of pre-1966 claims was agreed upon by the parties. Id. at 668.
73. The court directed a verdict for the defendants on all other charges based in part on a
failure to prove causation and in part on a failure to demonstrate a duty (for pre-1966 charges).
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487,1493-1500 (D.N.J. 1988).
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defendants on the latter two claims,74 but found that Liggett breached both
its duty to warn and its express warranty prior to 1966."s Mrs. Cipollone
was found to have voluntarily assumed a known danger by smoking, how-
ever, and the jury attributed 80% of the responsibility to her.16 Therefore,
under New Jersey's comparative negligence statute, Mrs. Cipollone was de-
nied recovery.77 Mr. Cipollone was awarded $400,000 on the breach of war-
ranty claim. 8
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the award due to flaws in the jury
instructions, but upheld the District Court's decision regarding the implicit
preemption of Cipollone's advertising and warning claims. 79 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and, in a seven-to-two decision, held that the 1965
Act did not preempt any state law actions for damages, including those re-
lating to advertising and warnings.80 The Court noted, however, that the
1969 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which renewed the 1965 Act
and strengthened several of its provisions, did preempt claims arising after
1969 based on fraudulent misrepresentation and failure to warn through ad-
vertising.8 The Court reversed in part and remanded for further
proceedings.82
The practical effect of the Supreme Court's ruling was to expose the to-
bacco industry to massive potential liability. The decision illustrates the
Court's unwillingness to remove all judicial options from a plaintiff who has
been injured by smoking. The Court rejected the tobacco industry's argu-
ment that Congress intended to bar all health-based obligations that ciga-
rette manufacturers might have regarding warnings and advertising. 83 For
the potential ETS plaintiff, this ruling underscores a changing judicial atti-
tude with regard to damages claims for injury from smoking. The courts
have made it easier for a plaintiff to recover by removing an obstacle from
the path of litigation. The decision allows ETS plaintiffs to start from a
much better position in their attempts to recover for their own injuries, par-
74. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. New Jersey's comparative negligence statute precludes recovery if the plaintiff was
more negligent than the defendant. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1987).
78. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for Liggett's breach of an express war-
ranty, but specified that only Mr. Cipollone sustained damages. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. at
210. The award was a compromise reached among the jurors to avoid a hung jury. Jacobson,
supra note 8, at 1055-56.
79. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1990).
80. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
81. Id. at 2621-22 (failure to warn), 2623-24 (fraudulent misrepresentations).
82. Id. at 2625.
83. Id. at 2618-19.
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ticularly since the assumption of risk defense does not apply as it did to bar
Mrs. Cipollone's recovery. In the absence of acceptance of ETS's carcino-
genic nature by the Occupational Health and Safety Agency (OSHA), the
lack of sufficient evidence may pose a problem for courts reticent to award
monetary damages; however, the EPA's recent report classifying ETS as a
class A carcinogen will serve as strong support from a governmental source.
Actions taken by passive smoking litigants prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Cipollone have sought injunctive relief with limited success.84
Like the early smoking plaintiffs, the ETS plaintiffs met with unsympathetic
public sentiment and judicial skepticism. 5
C Assessing Passive Smoking Litigation to Date
Nonsmokers seeking judicial relief have attempted to assert a constitu-
tional right to breathe clean air, particularly in the workplace. The most
important of the early cases, Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dis-
trict,6 involved a 1976 class action suit to enjoin the owners of the Louisi-
ana Superdome from allowing tobacco smoking during events in the
stadium. The plaintiffs argued that the smoke impaired the exercise of their
right to receive others' thoughts and ideas because enjoyment of a public
function could not be had without the accompanying smoke.87 The plaintiffs
also argued that the state was violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments by depriving them, without due process, of the right to breathe clean
air freely, a right they claimed was protected as life, liberty, and property.
88
The District Court dismissed all the constitutional claims.8 9 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed,9° comparing the plaintiff's attempt to ban smoking
in the Superdome to Prohibition and suggesting that alcohol was "something
fully as physically harmful as tobacco smoke, if not more so."91 Such a
comparison reflects both judicial skepticism and public animosity toward
nonsmokers' assertion of health risks.
The Gasper case has been followed on several occasions by other courts
84. See infra notes 86-116 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 722
(E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979);
Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972); GASP v. Mecklenburg
County, 256 S.E.2d 477, 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
86. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
87. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 718.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 722.
90. Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
91. Id. at 899.
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dismissing claims brought under the rubric of constitutional rights.92 In
each case, the court refused to recognize that tobacco smoke might infringe
on any constitutional right. Recent cases involving incarcerated nonsmok-
ing plaintiffs, however, have implicated the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment with varying degrees of success.93
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether a deci-
sion by prison officials not to segregate nonsmoking inmates represents inhu-
mane punishment.94 The case below, McKinney v. Anderson,95 involved a
state prisoner in Nevada who complained that exposure to ETS caused him
nosebleeds, headaches, and chest pains.96 McKinney sought damages as
well as injunctive relief.97
The case was heard before a magistrate, who granted a directed verdict for
the defendant. 98 The magistrate reasoned that McKinney either had a right
to a smoke-free environment, or a right to medical attention for serious med-
ical needs.9 9 Reversing in part, 1" the Ninth Circuit held that ETS reached a
level of unconstitutional punishment when the levels of concentration posed
an unreasonable risk of harm to the inmate's health.'° The court paid par-
ticularly close attention to the EPA draft report on ETS, as well as to the
nature of incarceration, which poses an especially severe problem of ETS
exposure for prisoners.' 0 2 Finally, it noted that public opinion reflected "a
need to protect non-smokers from involuntary exposure to ETS.' ' 10 3 The
court remanded the case for proceedings to determine whether the exposure
was an unreasonable risk to the inmate's health."°
92. See, e.g., Kensell v. Oklahoma, 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983); Federal Employees for
Non-smokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
93. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing EPA draft report in
reversing directed verdict); Clemmons v. Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990) (distin-
guishing Kensell, reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim, and remanding for trial);
Avery v. Powell, 695 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.H. 1988) (refusing to dismiss inmate's claim). But cf
Caldwell v. Quinlan, 729 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 923 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (facilities
for nonsmokers and limited nonsmoker housing sufficient for Eighth Amendment purposes);
Gorman v. Moody, 710 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (citing standards of decency in
dismissing claim).
94. Helling v. McKinney, 112 S. Ct. 3024 (1992).
95. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991).
96. Id. at 1502.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1503.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1509-12.
101. Id. at 1508.
102. Id. at 1506-08.
103. Id. at 1509.
104. Id. at 1512.
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The Supreme Court vacated, remanding to the court the issue of whether
a prisoner would be required to show a particular state of mind on the part
of the prison officials.'15 Consistent with the request, the Ninth Circuit re-
manded for further proceedings to determine whether the prison officials
showed "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's problem. 116 The Supreme
Court again granted certiorari and will now rehear the case to decide
whether the Eighth Amendment is implicated by the ETS exposure." °7
The implications for other ETS litigants are twofold. First, the courts'
acceptance of the argument that secondhand smoke may constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in certain cases shows a willingness to accept the
scientific evidence as proof of the hazardous nature of ETS.'08 Second, the
courts are recognizing that public policy is in favor of minimization of
smoke inhalation."19 Both arguments may, to a certain extent, be extrapo-
lated into workplace safety arguments. Although employees may theoreti-
cally leave when others smoke, the realities of the job usually compel the
individual to inhale a certain amount of smoke unwillingly. The use of con-
stitutional arguments on behalf of passive smokers is clearly weak in light of
the above cases, but similar lines of discussion might succeed in establishing
actions for damages or injunctive relief at the state level.
Precedent exists for state courts to issue injunctive relief for nonsmokers
subjected to ETS. In Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co.,"10 a case with par-
ticular relevance to future ETS exposure actions against employers, plaintiff
sought to enjoin smoking in her immediate workplace area."' 1 She alleged a
failure of the defendant to provide the safe working environment that under
New Jersey common law is an affirmative duty of the employer. 12 Plaintiff
established that she suffered from a severe allergic reaction to the smoke.'
1 3
The court, reviewing the scientific evidence before it, concluded that ciga-
105. Helling v. McKinney, 112 S. Ct. 291 (1991), vacating and remanding McKinney v.
Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991).
106. McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (1992).
107. Helling v. McKinney, 112 S. Ct. 3024 (1992). This issue is also being litigated in
other circuits; for example, the Tenth Circuit has also found that ETS exposure presents a
legitimate Eighth Amendment claim. Clemmons v. Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858, 865 (10th Cir.
1990). In contrast, a federal inmate lost an almost identical argument in the D.C. Circuit
Court. Caldwell v. Quinlan, 923 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
108. See, e.g., McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1508; Clemmons, 918 F.2d at 865.
109. See, e.g., McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1508; Clemmons, 918 F.2d at 865. But see Cald-
well, 729 F. Supp. at 6.
110. 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
111. Id. at 409.
112. Id. at 410.
113. Plaintiff's symptoms included nose, eyes, and throat irritation; nosebleeds; headaches;
nausea; and vomiting. The court apparently accepted the suggestion that the plaintiff was
allergic to the smoke. Id.
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rette smoke was toxic to passive smokers and was not a necessary byproduct
of the company's business activities."' Although the court explicitly re-
stricted the smoking areas within the building, it also concluded that a
smoking employee should have a "reasonably accessible area" in which to
smoke."l 5 As a result, the defendant was enjoined from permitting smoking
anywhere outside the nonwork cafeteria." 6
The Shimp court showed remarkable prescience in accepting the scientific
evidence as proof of the harmful nature of ETS exposure. Future courts
would do well to follow similar rationales in determining the proper resolu-
tion of workplace smoking problems. The restriction of smokers to a con-
fined, separate area satisfies both the need for a smoke-free workplace and
the addiction of smoking employees. Such a solution appears to be a reason-
able balance between the needs of the different employees.
III. SCHOLEM v NEW SOUTH WALES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH:
AUSTRALIAN PLAINTIFFS "PASSIVE" No LONGER
A. Justice Morling and the Scientific Shortcut
The first breakthrough in passive smoking litigation came in February
1991, when the Federal Court of Australia ruled that overwhelming scien-
tific evidence supports the contention that passive smoking is a cause of lung
cancer, asthma, and other respiratory diseases." 7 The ruling resulted from a
case brought against the tobacco industry by a consumer group that objected
to a tobacco advertisement stating that "there is little evidence and nothing
which proves scientifically that cigarette smoke causes disease in non-
smokers.""'  The Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations
(AFCO), plaintiffs in the case against the Tobacco Institute of Australia
(TIA), sought an injunction against further use of the advertisement, argu-
ing that the text was misleading and inaccurate.' 19 Justice Trevor Morling
114. The court was so convinced of the toxicity of cigarette smoke that it took judicial
notice of the fact. Id. at 411, 413-15.
115. Id. at 416.
116. Id. The court also appeared greatly offended at the fact that the company had given
its human employee short shrift, but prohibited smoking around telephone equipment on the
grounds that the machinery is extremely sensitive. In the court's words, Human beings are
also very sensitive .... Unlike a piece of machinery, the damage to a human is all too often
irreparable. Id.
117. Australian Court Rules Passive Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, UPI, Feb. 8, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinafter UPI Article].
118. Gloria Negri, Australian Court Ruling Called Impetus for Mass. Antismoking Lobby,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 1991, at 20 (citing R. Everingham & S. Woodward eds., TOBACCO
LITIGATION: AFCO v. TIA, THE CASE AGAINST PASSIVE SMOKING (1991)).
119. UPIArticle, supra note 117, at 1.
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of the Federal Court agreed, and in a lengthy analysis of the current scien-
tific data regarding passive smoking, concluded that "[s]mokers are likely to
be misled or deceived in believing that their smoking does not prejudice the
health of non-smokers, particularly small children," and drew a conclusion
that cigarette smoke causes lung cancer in passive smokers "from the totality
of the available data and by valid reasoning from it."120 Morling granted the
injunction and ordered the TIA to pay the plaintiffs' court costs, which to-
talled roughly $1 million.' 2 '
The finding galvanized the federal and local governments in Australia,
which immediately set about reviewing their laws against smoking, with the
anti-smoking lobbies, which sought to reinforce their newfound momen-
tum.' 22 As noted by the New South Wales Health Minister, Morling's find-
ing opened up employers to wide-ranging and unforeseen liability for health
risks to nonsmokers.' 23 The tobacco industry appealed the decision to the
Full Bench of the Federal Court, but before that panel could act upon the
appeal, a second seminal case appeared in the New South Wales District
Court and further demonstrated the willingness of the courts to draw con-
clusions from the scientific evidence already present. The case, Scholem v.
New South Wales Department of Health, 24 raises several issues that might
also come into play in future ETS cases brought in American courts.
B. Scholem v. New South Wales Department of Health
In Scholem, the plaintiff Liesel Scholem sued her former employer, the
Department of Health, for exacerbating her asthmatic condition and causing
her to develop emphysema.' 2 ' During the ten years she worked for the De-
partment as a psychiatrist, Scholem was exposed to cigarette smoke con-
stantly without adequate ventilation.' 26 As a result, according to Scholem,
her preexisting asthma condition was irritated to such an extent that the
condition worsened and became chronic. 127 A number of her former col-
leagues testified that Scholem often complained of the smoke to her cowork-
120. Id.
121. Negri, supra note 118, at 20. Of course, the plaintiff's court costs--equivalent to $1
million American-comes on top of the industry's own expenses, which were estimated at
between $5 and $7 million American. Id.; see also Brook Turner & Mark Lawson, Australia:
Both Sides Claim a Win in Smoking Case, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 18, 1992, at 7.
122. UPI Article, supra note 117, at 1.
123. Id.
124. Scholem v. New S. Wales Dep't of Health, No. 40830/86 (D.N.S. Wales, May 27,
1992) (unreported; on file with The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
125. Record at 24, Scholem (No. 40830/86).
126. Id. at 24, 46-47.
127. Id. at 67-68.
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ers, but did not always leave the room when someone began smoking. 2 '
Scholem, in response, contended that she lacked authority to tell her co-
workers and clients to stop smoking, and that the number of smokers in the
department at any given time made it impossible for her to escape the
smoke. 2 9 She suffered through the ETS exposure for ten years until the
department finally enacted strict limitations on smoking in the workplace. 3o
Scholem sued the Department of Health on three grounds, two statutory
and one arising at common law.13 ' The basis for the statutory argument was
the Factories, Shops and Industries Act of 1964, that required employers to
provide enough ventilation to avoid insufficient or stagnant air and also re-
quired the regulation of any fumes resulting from the processes of the "fac-
tory."' 1 3 2 The common law action was based on the department's negligent
failure to provide reasonable care for the health of its workers. 133 Both sides
relied heavily on the testimony of expert witnesses to establish or refute the
connection between the exposure to ETS and the aggravated asthma and
emphysema.' 
34
The case was heard before a jury of four. In his instructions to the jury,
the trial judge emphasized that the scientific proof was only part of the anal-
ysis to be made when deciding the causation issue.' 35 Following the court's
attempt to deemphasize the scientific and technical aspects of the problem,
the jury deliberated for four hours before finding the defendant negligent in
its failure to regulate or prohibit smoking in the workplace based on the state
of knowledge that existed at the time regarding the hazards of inhaling sec-
ondary smoke.' 36 Scholem was awarded $85,000 in damages, 137 but the
128. Id. at 56-57.
129. Id. at 46.
130. Id. at 48.
131. Id. at 24-25.
132. Factories, Shops and Industries Act of 1962, §§ 23(4), 41(2) (commenced May 4,
1962; assented April 21, 1962). Section 23(4) requires employers to provide [s]uitable atmos-
pheric conditions ... to avoid insufficient air supply, stagnant or vitiated air; Section 41(2) is
intended to prevent the buildup of fumes that are generated in connection with any process
carried on in a factory. Id.
133. Record at 24, Scholem (No. 40830/86).
134. Id. at 32A.
135. Justice Morling instructed the jurors:
As I said, you are not scientists. You are not here to decide for the purposes of
publication in some scientific journal what is the cause of Mrs [sic] Scholem's present
asthmatic condition. You are here to decide whether exposure to environmental to-
bacco smoke was a cause of, or a materially contributing factor to, her present asth-
matic state.
Id. at 28.
136. Gareth Boreham, Anti-Smoke Award: More May Follow, MELBOURNE AGE, May 28,
1992, at 1.
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symbolic and precedential value of the decision far outweighed the actual
cost to the tobacco industry.
C. The Aftermath of Scholem
Implications of the Scholem decision for Australian employers and the
tobacco industry were numerous. First, the verdict reinforced the earlier
Federal Court ruling regarding the link between ETS exposure and health
risks. Second, employers faced potentially massive liability in cases involv-
ing later exposures, because the state of knowledge is more advanced than it
was in the 1970s and early 1980s. Third, although Liesel Scholem received
only $85,000, future litigants may recover much larger sums by filing in
courts that do not share the District Court's $100,000 ceiling.1
38
Australian governmental agencies reacted to the verdict quickly. The
New South Wales Health Minister warned all employers that they risked
being sued if they allowed smoking in the workplace.' 39 Legal counsel to the
government in Victoria indicated that mere exposure to passive smoking
health risks would suffice to bring an action under that region's Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act. " In June, the Federal Airports Commission
banned smoking entirely at all international and domestic airports."'
The success of the anti-smoking forces has not been uniform. On Decem-
ber 18, 1992, the Full Bench of the Federal Court curtailed the scope and
effect of Justice Morling's ruling in Australian Federation of Consumer Orga-
nizations v. TIA (AFCO v. TIA). 142 The appellate panel, which vacated the
injunction against the tobacco companies, specifically disapproved Justice
Morling's attempt to draw conclusions regarding the scientific link between
ETS exposure and health risks.'43 Justice Hill, speaking for the panel, indi-
cated that none of the reviewing jurists was capable of drawing such a con-
clusion on the basis of present information.'" The appellate decision clearly
undercuts the strength of Justice Morling's earlier ruling. The full effect of
137. Id. The judge adjusted the award to reflect workers' compensation payments already
received and added interest. The final adjusted amount was $64,361. Id.
138. Id. See also Tina Diaz, Court Puts Smokers Out in the Cold, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD, May 28, 1992, at 1.
139. UPIArticle, supra note 117, at 1.
140. See Smoking Hazard to More than Health, MELBOURNE AGE, May 29, 1992, at 12
[hereinafter Smoking Hazard].
141. Smoking Banned at Australian Airports, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 30, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
142. See Turner & Lawson, supra note 121, at 7.
143. Id.
144. In Justice Hill's words,
[A]t the end of the day, the question of the relationship between environmental to-
bacco smoke and disease is a matter for scientists trained in the area, it is not a
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the court's reversal, however, remains to be seen. Scholem will probably
serve much the same function as did the AFCO ruling, although the target
has shifted from the tobacco industry to public and private employers.
D. Could It Happen Here? Why Employers Should Fear Scholem
From an American standpoint, the decision in Scholem is a harbinger of
things to come if greater efforts are not made to provide a safe working
environment. The common-law negligence action upon which the jury
found the Department of Health liable is substantially identical from a legal
standpoint to its counterpart in this country. 4 5 Moreover, anti-smoking
groups here have already indicated a willingness to proceed with similar ac-
tions, buoyed by Ms. Scholem's success. 46 Several cases have already been
commenced, although none has proceeded to the final stages to date."' As
the scientific information increases, companies will be hard pressed to deny
awareness of the potential danger inherent in ETS exposure. The most dam-
aging aspect of the Scholem case, from the standpoint of the employer, is the
fact that the verdict alerts aspiring plaintiffs to the existence of a new and
broader category of defendants who are much less likely to afford or desire a
protracted legal struggle over the nebulous idea of duty to provide a smoke-
free environment. As will be seen below, employers are already beginning to
recognize that the "right to smoke" may be far more trouble and expense
than it is worth, even without the presence of myriad ETS negligence
lawsuits.1
48
IV. WORKPLACE SAFETY LAWS: THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
A. Occupational Legislation in America and Australia
Both Australia and the United States have enacted extensive legislation
designed to regulate the safety of workers and workplaces. In Australia,
each region has passed its own occupational health and safety legislation,
with the strictest found in Victoria and New South Wales.' 49 In Victoria,
matter for a court of law which is ill-equipped to determine it and to make the skilled
judgments upon which such a question depends.
Id.
145. For a discussion of the elements of the Australian negligence action, see Record at 25-
32A, Scholem (No. 40830/86).
146. See Negri, supra note 118, at 20 (At least two suits alleging harm from passive smok-
ing are pending in Massachusetts courts.); Mark Hansen, Second-Hand Smoke Suit, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1992, at 26 (flight attendants filing suit in Florida; other suits being contemplated).
147. See Hansen, supra note 146, at 26.
148. See infra notes 149-175 and accompanying text.
149. Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1985, No. 10190 (commenced Oct. 1, 1985,
assented July 30, 1985) (Vict.); Workplace Health and Safety Act of 1989, No. 63 of 1989
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for instance, employers may be at risk of criminal prosecution in the event
they are found guilty of allowing ETS pollution. 15' The major threat of fu-
ture ETS litigation in Australia stems from the legislative requirements that
employers provide a working environment that is safe for the employees and
without risk to their health.
The United States Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)'5 ' re-
quires that each employer provide a workplace area that is "free from recog-
nized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees."' 52 Although the courts have identified the OSH
Act as requiring agencies to provide safe and healthful employment environ-
ments, 153 the Act does not give employees a private cause of action against
federal employers.' 54 The primary potential for the OSH Act in America is
the ability and duty of the Occupational Health and Safety Agency (OSHA)
to identify and regulate workplace hazards.' 55 To date, however, OSHA has
failed to issue a statement regarding the identification of ETS as a hazard,
despite an attempt by a nonsmokers' rights activist group to compel such a
standard. 156 At present, OSHA is in the process of issuing a regulatory pro-
gram regarding ETS as a component of indoor air quality.'57 If the agency
designates ETS as a target for regulation, it may set standards for maximum
concentration of cigarette smoke in the workplace under the OSH Act. 5 '
The Australian treatment of ETS under its various regional workplace
health and safety acts is stricter and broader than under their federal coun-
terpart in the United States. For Australian anti-smoking crusaders, the
OHS acts are a cornerstone of workplace ETS litigation. In contrast, Ameri-
can ETS plaintiffs most likely cannot rely on the OSH Act unless the appro-
priate agency promulgates standards regulating ETS concentration. OSHA
(commenced June 10, 1989 and in part July 1, 1989; assented May 12, 1989) (Queensl.); Occu-
pational Health, Safety and Welfare Act of 1986 (commenced Apr. 16 and in part Nov. 30,
1987; assented Dec. 24, 1986) (So. Austl.); Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act of
1984, No. 101 of 1984 (commenced Apr. 4, 1985, assented Dec. 19, 1984) (W. Austl.); Indus-
trial Safety, Health and Welfare Act of 1977 (commenced Jan. 1, 1979, assented Sept. 21,
1977) (Tas.).
150. Smoking Hazard, supra note 140, at 12.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1988).
153. See, e.g., Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp.
181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
154. 446 F. Supp. at 183.
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
156. Action on Smoking & Health v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., No. 91-1037,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14,861 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 29, 1992) (denying writ of mandamus to compel
OSHA action).
157. See 57 Fed. Reg. 16,957 (1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. ch. XVII).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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is unlikely to take this specific action and instead will include ETS in a list of
components for overall indoor air quality. Plaintiffs in the United States are
more likely to receive favorable treatment under federal and state Clean Air
Acts.
B. Comparing Various Clean Air Acts
In the United States, under section 112 of the amended federal Clean Air
Act, the EPA is empowered to issue national standards for nearly 200 new
causal agents of hazardous air pollution.159 The EPA is required, after spe-
cific standards for each listed chemical are established, to determine the level
of public health risk remaining based on scientific information and then cre-
ate an "ample margin of safety" within the parameters of economic con-
straints and health concerns.'6° According to National Emission Standards
published by EPA in 1989, risks of cancer exceeding 1:1,000,000 for groups
of exposed people or 1:10,000 for individuals are the ceilings for adequate
protection under the Clean Air Act. 161 Section 112, however, has never
been applied to indoor air quality, although the Act does not specifically
limit consideration to outdoor factors. The EPA's own report identifying
ETS as a class A carcinogen will increase pressure on the government to
reassess its handling of ETS and its components.
The limitations of the federal Clean Air Act have led state governments to
propose their own statutory solution to smoking in public places. Forty-five
states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico have
established some regulation regarding smoking in at least one public area.'62
159. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(0 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
161. 54 Fed. Reg. 38,045 (1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
162. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.35.300305 (1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01 (1986 &
Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-27-701 to -703 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 25940-25944 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-14-101 to -104
(1989 & Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21b (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1327 (1987 & Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-911 to -913 (1989 & Supp. 1992); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 386.202-206 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-2 (Michie
Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 328K-2 to -6 (1991 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-5503
(1985 & Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 8202, 8204, 8206 (Supp. 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-13-4 to -5 (Bums 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 98A.1,2 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4009 to -4011 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1261
(West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1578-A to1580-D (West 1992); MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 24-502 (1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 72X, 122, 124 (West
1983 & Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.12601-17 (West 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 144.411-415 (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 71.760 (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-40-101 to -205 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5707 to -13 (1991); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 202.249 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 155:64-76 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:3D-1-54 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-16-1 to -8 (Michie 1978 &
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Several states have enacted their own Indoor Clean Air Acts, which are
more comprehensive statutes aimed at curbing ETS and other indoor pollu-
tants in the absence of federal action. 63 It is clear that in the United States,
for the time being, ETS plaintiffs are far more likely to receive favorable
treatment from state legislation and agencies than from the federal system,
which has been shackled by tobacco lobbyists and remains loath to harm the
economy of one of the country's largest exporting industries. In addition,
business owners can ill afford costly equipment designed to improve ventila-
tion to conform to EPA or OSHA regulations. By banning smoking en-
tirely, such ventilation costs are minimized, and the savings in health care
and improved productivity will offset losses incurred by businesses in trying
to improve air quality and minimize ETS exposure.'"
C. Social Mores and Economic Considerations
As mentioned before, in contrast to the early smoking litigants, the ETS
plaintiffs enjoy a judicial and social climate that is largely sympathetic to the
pursuit of clean air and aware of the harmful effects caused by smoking. No
more than thirty percent of the American population smokes today, and the
number has declined steadily in recent years. 165 Whereas the question of
limiting smoking areas indoors was once perceived as an affront to the per-
Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399n-x (McKinney 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
12-09 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3791.031 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 1-1521 to -1527 (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 433.845-850 (1991); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 1230.1 (Purdon Supp. 1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 1365 (1983); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7-3 (Michie 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-95-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-36-2 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-4-121 (1991);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.01 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106
(1990 & Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2752 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-291.1 to
-.7 (Michie Supp. 1992); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 891-5 (1970 & Supp. 1992); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.160.010-.070 (West 1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 101.123 (West 1988 & Supp.
1992).
163. California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have Indoor Clean Air Acts. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25940-25947 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 386.201-209
(West 1991 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-5501-5509 (1985 & Supp. 1992); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. Ill 1/2, paras. 8201-11 (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-13-4 to -5 (Bums
1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-40-101 to -205 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5707 to -13
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 155:64-76 (Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-16-1 to -
11 (1978 & Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 433.835-.875 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 1230.1-.33 (Michie Supp. 1992). Oklahoma has a Smoking in Public Places Act, and Rhode
Island has enacted a Workplace Smoking Pollution Control Act. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 1-1521 to -1527 (West Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7-1 to -7 (1992).
164. See infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
165. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 20-21.
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sonal right to smoke,' 6 6 the public has come to view the issue increasingly as
one of the right to breathe clean air free from interference by smokers. This
public policy shift makes it easier for employers to justify strict internal anti-
smoking measures. The policy is also reflected in both state and federal leg-
islation regarding limitations or prohibitions on public smoking; employers
need not fear being singled out for taking Draconian measures in the name
of environmental purity. In an era of dawning environmental awareness,
employers who take steps to eliminate smoking in their workplaces will en-
joy increasing support from the public and the employee population as well.
There is, however, a second, potentially more compelling argument to be
made for the cost-conscious employer. Elimination or regulation of indoor
smoking will not only bring the company in line with social trends and regu-
latory guidelines, and minimize the likelihood of litigation, but will also cut
down on health costs for the company. 67 For example, the American Can-
cer Society has estimated that smokers' insurance claims cost their employ-
ers $300 more than those of nonsmoking coworkers. Moreover, smokers
record more sick days by thirty to forty percent. 168 Smokers are fifty per-
cent more likely to require a hospital visit as well. 169 With health care costs
becoming increasingly unaffordable for small and mid-sized companies, the
opportunity to reduce such costs is an attractive alternative to going without
insurance.
Employers are already convinced by the statistical discrepancies and in
many cases have attempted to eliminate the problem entirely. In addition to
smoke-free workplaces, some employers have refused to hire smokers; the
Turner Broadcasting Network is a conspicuous example, having adopted
such a policy in 1986.170 The flat ban on employing smokers is receiving
heavy criticism from lawyers and legislators and has resulted in several
states considering or adopting "smokers' bills of rights," laws designed to
ensure that smokers are not discriminated against in the hiring process. '71
A second experiment presently underway at Texas Instruments levies a pen-
alty against any employee who smokes or has a family member who smokes;
a monthly surcharge is added to the employee's health insurance policy
166. See supra notes 86-92, 110-16 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 86-92, 110-16 and accompanying text.
168. Susan Harte, Business Report: On the Workplace, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 18,
1992, at C2.
169. Id.
170. Rene Sanchez, D.C. Set to Approve Law on Hiring Bias Against Smokers, WASH. POST,
Dec. 15, 1992, at B1, B3:
171. Id.; see also Dennis J. McGrath, New Laws Give More Rights to Employers, MINN.
STAR TRIB., May 17, 1992, at IA (reporting the Minnesota anti-discrimination law; and noting
that twenty-seven other states have passed similar legislation).
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A third option being explored by many companies is the so-called "well-
ness" plan, which provides employees with the means and the incentive to
improve their health by choosing a more beneficial lifestyle: the company
offers smoking cessation programs, for example, and encourages all employ-
ees to attend if the program is needed. 173 In 1991, thirty-two percent of
employers offered such wellness programs, almost twice the percentage of
employers offering wellness programs in 1989.174
The efforts by employers to counteract rising health costs will have the
added effect of minimizing liability against Scholem-type litigation. Contin-
uing trends in proactive insurance programs and policies designed to phase
out smoking in the workplace will continue irrespective of federal involve-
ment, although the process will be accelerated considerably in the event that
OSHA promulgates standards for indoor air pollution. While the EPA and
OSHA progress slowly toward a more stringent federal approach to the in-
door air pollution problem, the willingness of employers to take the initiative
in minimizing or banning smoking in the workplace should serve to facilitate
further progress by the government agencies.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, litigants seeking recovery for injuries from exposure to ETS
would do well to heed the problems faced by early smoking plaintiffs. Scien-
tific evidence linking ETS and health hazards is still subject to contradiction
and dispute within the scientific community itself, and courts may be loath
to hold companies liable for allowing smoking in their buildings absent some
compelling information similar to that possessed by the tobacco industry in
the early 1960s. The current economic climate also favors a more conserva-
tive judicial response to the problem. In Australia, the courts addressing the
issue of causation have already shown a lack of consensus at a fundamental
level. Similar disagreements are certain to occur when the American courts
are presented with the same scientific evidence.
ETS lawsuits may yet be an effective tool in accelerating America's trend
toward smoking bans. Public opinion, rising health care costs, and increas-
ingly stringent governmental regulations will catalyze the private sector into
implementing their own proactive indoor smoking bans before they are faced
172. Linda Borg, Company Sets Premium $10 Higher on Smokers, PROv. J.-BULL., Dec.
26, 1991, at Al. The plan has been criticized as an improper attempt to influence employees'
activities outside the workplace. Id. at A9.
173. Jerry Geisel, Some Relief on Health Costs, Bus. INS., Jan. 27, 1992, at 1, 78.
174. Id. at 78.
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with an explosion of litigation. Conversely, the willingness of the courts to
allow recovery for injuries from ETS exposure will be limited to cases of
documented hypersensitivity, such as Liesel Scholem's asthmatic condition,
until more concrete scientific conclusions can be drawn or until governmen-
tal agencies accelerate the process through statements similar to Justice
Morling's in Australia. The EPA's categorization of ETS as a class A car-
cinogen will serve as powerful support for ETS plaintiffs and will prod em-
ployers and OSHA into responsive action. Just as passive smoking litigation
catalyzed Australian employers into immediate action, economic considera-
tions and increasing federal acceptance of the causation element will catalyze
employers in the United States to enact their own in-house smoking policies
and avoid future liability for employee illnesses.
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